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Nowhere in the UK has the public servant been as pivotal in developing and
maintaining public services as in Northern Ireland (NI). The Northern Ireland
Executive collapsed in January 2017, and until January 2020, no ministers had been
appointed to represent the region. Of course, Northern Ireland has contended with
absentee ministers from Westminster throughout its recent history; however, never
before have civil servants in the region experienced such a prolonged period without
direct political oversight. It is therefore an opportune time to reflect on how the civil
servant role evolved and adapted during those years of power-sharing. In this
chapter, we reflect on the role conceptions of civil servants following the Good
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Friday Agreement, the period from December 1999 until January 2017. Kaufman’s
(1956) bureaucratic values are used to create a conceptual framework for identifying
the politics-administration dichotomy that underpins policy-making throughout this
period. While there have been disruptions to the status quo in the interim, relations
were permanently fractured in January 2017. Four stages of civil servant-politician
relationship can be identified: delivery-oriented, combative, collaborative, and sup-
plicant. We draw on documentary evidence and primary research to support these
conclusions. This experience of the bureaucrat in Northern Ireland serves as a
learning point for civil servants in other emerging power-sharing regimes – be
these civil servants operating in Westminster having to engage with multiparty rather
than single-party government or civil servants operating in an environment emerging
from conflict where power-sharing has been identified as the most appropriate
mechanism of conflict management.
Introduction
The separation of administration from politics lead to the development of the
discipline of public administration. While in traditional Weberian and Wilsonian
doctrines of public administration the bureaucrat was supposed to serve, not repre-
sent, it has long been acknowledged that the boundaries between politics and public
administration are increasingly porous. Kingsley (1944) argued that it did not matter
whether a decision was made in Westminster or Whitehall – by the politician or the
bureaucrat: as both shared the same norms, beliefs, values, and life experiences, both
would make the same decision, given the same access to information. Even at this
early stage, the lines between political and bureaucratic decision-making were
coming into question. While much is known about politico-administrative relations
in homogenous societies, much less is known about this relationship within the
power-sharing environment. In this chapter, we draw on Kaufman’s (1956) bureau-
cratic values to create a conceptual framework for understanding the politico-
administrative dichotomy within the contested society of Northern Ireland. We
draw on interview and documentary evidence to trace this development over the
past 20 years of power-sharing.
Bureaucrat Discretion and Political Control
Bureaucratic discretion has been acknowledged to exist extensively within the
public administration: “The ubiquity of bureaucratic discretion makes the problem
of administrative responsibility a central and enduring concern in American
government. . .” and has “forced scholars to grapple with problems of bureaucratic
accountability, responsibility and responsiveness” (Kaufman 1956 p172,179). The
problems arising from bureaucrat discretion and political control have received
extensive attention in the literature (Kaufman 1956; Meier and O’Toole 2006);
however, less is known about the nature of this discretion within the power-sharing
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society and how this discretion changes over time. We therefore ask: What is the
nature of politician-bureaucrat dichotomy, and how does this change over time?
Kaufman (1956) proposes that there are “three bureaucratic values” that guide
bureaucratic reform: executive leadership, representativeness, and neutral compe-
tence. It is, Kaufman submits, the interaction of these three values that have
determined the nature of public administration in the USA over time. Each of
these values has been dominant, but not to the point of suppression of each of the
others at various points in US history. The quest for representativeness began
following American independence where the governor was appointed for very
short terms and rarely had a veto over the legislature. In Kaufman’s (1956, p1058)
words:
the office was regarded as primarily ceremonial and a symbol of honour rather than as a seat
of power, and it therefore rarely attracted men of distinction in the early days of the
Republic. . .As one authority has remarked, they served their short terms and returned to
private life with few accomplishments behind them and nothing before them but the pleasure
of being called “Governor” for the rest of their days.
What followed was the quest for neutral competence in the early nineteenth
century. As the industrial system developed, “corruption beset legislatures, from
county boards and city councils right up to Congress itself, and the venality and
incompetence of many public officers and employers were common knowledge”
(Kaufman 1956 p1059). This movement sought to take public administration out of
politics, giving birth to the politics-administration dichotomy. The final quest for
executive leadership came in the 1940s where the Office of the American President
expanded considerably. He now had numerous advisers and sought to directly
influence many aspects of governance:
chief executives, in whom administrative responsibility and power were to be lodged, were
also partisan politicians. . ..Gradually, therefore, the politics-administration dichotomy fell
out of favor in public administration, and the doctrine of the continuity of the policy-
formulating process, better suited to the aims of executive leadership, began to replace it
(Kaufman 1956, p1067)
Despite the sequential development of these values, Kaufman reiterates that while
at each stage a value is dominant, the new value supersedes, not replaces the former.
We use these bureaucratic values as a mechanism for analyzing the politico-admin-
istrative dichotomy within the power-sharing society. Mengistu and Vogel
(2006:205) remind us that it is bureaucratic values that underpin administrative
reforms, and if these “fundamental bureaucratic values are unexamined, the tension
between reform efforts and applied civil service values may manifest as obstacles to
democratic reform. . ..” Kaufman’s theory speaks directly to the “competencies of a
skilled, effective bureaucracy” (ibid) and is, therefore, a useful conceptual lens to
understand the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy in transition.
Interview participants were identified by theory-driven purposive sampling and
snowballing: methods employed in recognition of their specific utility for
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populations from which interviews can be hard to elicit (Bleich and Pekkanon 2015,
p9). Overall 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted between May and
November 2018 with elite-level civil servants (grades 5 and above). In addition to
current senior civil servants, four former senior civil servants were identified as a
result of snowballing. All consented to interview. All interviews were digitally
recorded, transcribed, and fully anonymized. Interview length ranged from 1 h to
1 h 45 min. Interviews were coded and analyzed thematically using NVivo software.
Braun and Clarke’s model of thematic analysis (2006) was selected as an appropriate
method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns within data that would
facilitate the capture of rich detail. Interview data was triangulated with transcripts of
evidence provided to the Renewable Heat Incentive inquiry. (“The RHI Inquiry has
been established to investigate a particular government scheme – the non domestic
renewable heat incentive scheme – which was set up to assist in complying with
obligations imposed by the law of the European Union in the area of renewable
energy. The Northern Ireland scheme, which has similarities to a scheme in Great
Britain, was devised and implemented by the then Department of Enterprise, Trade
and Investment. The scheme’s purpose was to provide a financial incentive for
businesses to move away from non-renewable sources of energy. However, how
the scheme came about in the form in which it was adopted, how it has been operated
and the possible financial consequences of the scheme have become the source of
considerable public concern. The RHI Inquiry will investigate the circumstances
surrounding this scheme” RHI terms of reference.).
The Renewable Heat Incentive was a flawed green energy scheme that precipi-
tated the collapse of power-sharing government in NI. A subsequent independent
public inquiry into the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) identified complex failings
in governance. During 114 days of public hearings, testimony from senior civil
servants, ministers, and special advisers (SPADs) exposed a litany of problems and
dysfunction at the heart of government. For our purpose, the RHI inquiry has
provided an unprecedented insight into the workings of devolution and the nature
of the politico-administrative relationship.
The following sections identify the politico-administrative dichotomy through
Northern Ireland’s four phases of governance in recent history. The subsequent
section analyzes this evidence, generating a conceptual framework for mapping
this dichotomy through the four phases.
Four Phases of Governance
A review of the literature leads us to define four phases of governance in Northern
Ireland’s recent history: direct rule, devolution, a honeymoon period where power-
sharing became established, and finally the power-splitting phase where the political
parties split power along ethno-political lines. We discuss each of these phases in
turn below.













Phase One: Direct Rule
The proroguing of NI’s Parliament in 1972 as a response to escalating civil conflict
heralded a period of direct rule from London. During this period, temporary administra-
tive arrangements for Northern Ireland involved the appointment of a Secretary of State
and up to four junior ministers. These interim arrangements became entrenched as a state
of “permanent impermanence” (Bloomfield 1998 in Knox and Carmichael 2005, p97)
until devolution to a new Northern Ireland Assembly in 1999.
Direct rule ministers were frequently responsible for up to two NI departments in
addition to their Westminster and constituency obligations. In this regional context,
the nature of direct engagement between ministers and NI bureaucrats was consid-
ered “sporadic and superficial” (Carmichael and Osborne 2003, p208). Bureaucrat
relationships with local politicians were equally distant. Legislation from Northern
Ireland processed at Westminster was largely processed by virtue of statutory
instrument. Unlike parliamentary bills, statutory instruments are not subject to
amendment. In the absence of an active scrutiny role, NI bureaucrats could anticipate
similarly sporadic and superficial engagement with local politicians over the course
of their career. The position of the senior bureaucrat as a largely autonomous entity
during the period is succinctly captured by Morison and Livingstone (1995, p154):
the comparatively small number of these officials and their relative public invisibility has
accentuated the idea of government by an elite, a sense captured by the notion that all
important decisions are taken in six key dining rooms in North Down.
The policy role of the NI bureaucrat during the period of direct rule was
circumscribed to one of modest adaptation and delivery of policy designed at
Westminster. As one senior civil servant commented:
We didn’t do much policy in Northern Ireland because we didn’t have to. Policy was
something that arrived from Westminster and the job, not to oversimplify it, was scoring
out ‘England and Wales’ and inserting ‘Northern Ireland’ in a policy paper or a piece of
legislation. When you are not exercising a skill over a long period of time, it tends to atrophy.
We also lost whatever political astuteness that we had – we had become disconnected from
the local body politic because for 30 years it wasn’t necessary to listen to people. It was only
necessary to look to Westminster. (From Knox 2009)
The delivery-orientated nature of the NICS policy function operated in aberration
of the equilibrium between design and delivery:
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we were very much a delivery civil service, and the balance was off, any public service has to
have both. (Interview 20)
Scott Bollens’ (2000, p230) study identifies the neutral strategy adopted by
policy-makers in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s – policy-making relied on
technical rational data in resource allocation, and policy-makers distanced them-
selves from issues of ethnic identity, power inequalities, and political exclusion.
Citizens were treated as individuals, not as being from a particular community,
giving rise to the term color-blind policy-making (Bollens 2000).
In summary, dynamics from above (the Whitehall model) and below (drivers for
symmetry in conflict management) evidence a strong neutrality norm within the
bureaucracy during this period. The role of the bureaucrat during the direct rule
period is further characterized by limited interface with politicians, the absence of a
scrutiny role, and an atrophy in NICS policy development capacity and responsive-
ness. Viewed through the lens of Kaufman’s three competing bureaucratic values
(neutral competence, representativeness, and executive leadership), the absence of
locally elected politicians suppresses drivers for executive leadership and represen-
tativeness. Bureaucrat role conception is firmly rooted in neutral competence.
Phase Two: Devolution 1999–2005
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement set out arrangements for the establishment of new
political institutions in Northern Ireland, among them the creation of a legislative
assembly, spearheaded by a multiparty executive, firmly grounded in principles of
consociational power-sharing (Lijphart 1969). The politician bureaucrat relationship
is considered here in the context of the transition from servicing remote majoritarian
government to the exigencies of complex multiparty consociation. We further reflect
on relationship-building in the context of attempts by local politicians to assert
newfound authority and bureaucratic reactions to heightened local scrutiny and
exposure. Finally, we consider the relationship against the intermittency of devolu-
tion in the period and the failure to bed in new institutional arrangements. In light of
these considerations, we argue that the absence of trust and collective purpose
calibrated a politico-administrative dynamic which functioned combatively in this
period.
The transition to devolved power-sharing required a paradigm shift for the
Northern Ireland Civil Service from its previous delivery function under direct rule
to a live policy-making environment. The new political landscape required a high
degree of sophistication in the development of policy that could be both responsive
to locally determined priorities and sufficiently nuanced to accommodate the diverse
ideological perspectives within the multiparty NI Executive. In this regard, the NICS
were distinctly unprepared. Knox and McMahon (2014:3–4) note that many civil
servants lacked requisite skills in policy formulation because of their reliance under
direct rule on the “read-across” of policies from Westminster. The combination of a
need to develop capacity within the bureaucracy taken with local political actors’
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need for quick deliverables in validation of political risks taken in the context of the
Good Friday Agreement reveals an immediate mismatch in expectation and capacity.
Initial politician-bureaucrat relations additionally bore the hallmarks of a legacy
of distrust and suspicion which had developed in the context of direct rule. Local
politicians had traditionally regarded NI bureaucrats as “remote and unresponsive”
(Carmichael and Osborne 2003, p214) and were keen to assert their newfound
authority:
One thing I would say that was probably quite strong was [...] senior civil servants felt and
understood that there was probably a suspicion of the civil service by the parties. We’d been
there during direct rule you know and there was a certain element of ‘right, were in charge
now.’ (Interview with former SCS (Interview 17))
Equally, senior NI bureaucrats were distinctly underwhelmed by the caliber of
local politicians, the majority of whom had no direct experience of Belfast. Gov-
ernment, regarding them as “parochial and lacking in strategic vision” (Carmichael
and Osborne 2003). Arrangements for Northern Ireland Assembly Committees
differed dramatically from the “light-touch” approach NI bureaucrats had previously
experienced within the Westminster committee system. As a feature of NI’s distinct
power-sharing arrangements, committee chairs were often selected in opposition to
the designation of the departmental minister. A department headed by a Unionist
minister, for example, would have a Nationalist as committee chair. This symmet-
rical arrangement designed to encourage cooperation between community designa-
tions laid the foundations for an adversarial character to the exercise of committee
scrutiny functions. Committees can be said to have embraced with some aplomb
their ability to summon departmental officials and papers. Carmichael (2002, p182)
recounts how the proactive approach to scrutiny taken by some Assembly Commit-
tees caused a measure of “discomfort and resentment” among some senior officials.
The development of politico-administrative relations during this period was
significantly inhibited by intermittency and inability to consolidate new power-
sharing arrangements. During the period, the institutions were suspended by the
Secretary of State on four separate occasions. Formal direct rule from Westminster
was reintroduced between 11 February 2000 and 20 May 2000 with two 1-day
suspensions (11 August 2001 and 21 September 2001). The inability to secure
requisite political consensus for the nascent institutions culminated in the eventual
decision on 14 October 2002 to place them in cold storage, pending a further round
of political negotiations to resolve outstanding issues. With the institutions
embroiled in perma-crisis, the attention of elite political actors remained firmly
focused on institutional power plays at the expense of the development of a distinct
policy program or collective identity.
Returning to Kaufman’s model of competing bureaucratic values (neutral com-
petence, representativeness, and executive leadership), we argue that in terms of
bureaucrat role conception, neutrality remained ascendant, mediated by a proce-
dural if not yet substantive representativeness on account of new (de facto if not yet
de jure) power-sharing institutional arrangements. Executive leadership, however,
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remains critically impeded by the failure to consolidate a collective executive
identity and agenda.
Phase Three: Power-Sharing 2006–2011
The Political Environment
Following elections in November 2003, the DUP and Sinn Féin emerged as the
largest parties, fundamentally altering the balance of power in NI. The DUP’s refusal
to share power with Sinn Féin, however, precipitated a further collapse of the
Northern Ireland Assembly. A parallel process of confidence-building measures
ensued. Measures which included commitments toward demilitarization and assur-
ances in respect of the decommissioning of IRAweapons paved the way for a further
round of multiparty negotiations. A deal brokered by the British and Irish Govern-
ments at St Andrews in October 2006 ushered forth the next phase in the governance
of Northern Ireland: a period of genuine power-sharing. In addition to agreement for
the restoration power-sharing institutions and a commitment for the devolution of
policing and justice powers, the deal included provisions for a statutory Ministerial
Code, circumscribing the capacity for any single minister or party to make signifi-
cant decisions outside of the collectivity of the NI Executive.
During this period, a newfound rapport is widely considered to have displaced
enmity between the two main parties. Former enemies, DUP’s First Minister Ian Paisley
and Sinn Féin’s Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness, were popularly deemed the
“chuckle brothers” on account of having “chuckled their way through devolutions bright
new beginning” (Gordon 2017). The new political consensus withstood numerous
challenges to cooperation: most notably the killing of two British soldiers and a PSNI
officer in 2009. Unity was most acutely reflected in a joint press conference from the
steps of Stormont castle presenting Peter Robinson (First Minister), Martin McGuinness
(Deputy First Minister), and Hugh Orde (PSNI Chief Constable) in “an important and
symbolic display of unity” (Knox 2010, p40). A further round of successful negotiations
culminated in the Hillsborough Agreement in 2010 which paved the way for the
devolution of hitherto contentious policing and justice powers. Notwithstanding this
political consensus, it is the relationship between these Ministers and their civil servants
that most interests us here.
In this phase, we consider changing civil servant role conceptions, the
outworking of a conflict management role in the bureaucracy, and the emergent
role of the special adviser. In this phase, politico-administrative relations have
stabilized with political consensus enabling common purpose. The evolving rela-
tionship between NICS bureaucrats and politicians in this phase is captured by the
then Head of the Civil Service, Sir Bruce Robinson (2008–2011), who described
civil servants as the “mortar” between the political bricks, further acknowledging
that civil servants had to “win the trust of politicians” who were initially wary of
NICS – an organization which had for years been controlled from London (Cham-
bers 2010).
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Robinson acknowledges that maintaining trust in the politician bureaucrat rela-
tionship in the content of the new political dispensation “requires a heightened
political awareness among civil servants” (Chambers 2010). Of particular signifi-
cance, however, is the translation of this “heightened awareness” into an active role
for NI bureaucrats, as distinct from their counterparts at Whitehall. Robinson
explains that it is vital to “have sensitivity to the political spectrum, and help
ministers by testing out some of the points and tabling some of the issues that
you’re conscious other parties will be concerned about – all with the objective of
facilitating an outcome that’s satisfactory to the minister” (Chambers 2010). Robin-
son acknowledges that in the context of the new political dispensation, NI bureau-
crats frequently find themselves “hammering out a consensus or common view”
(Chambers 2010). Bureaucrats during this era are found to play a pivotal role in the
day-to-day management of power-sharing (O’Connor 2012). This is a substantial
departure from the role of the traditional civil servant. While traditionally the civil
servant would serve the government of the day, in this period, the civil servant is also
tasked with maintaining a coerced coalition government.
This period also witnessed the emergence of the special adviser (SPAD) as a key
player in the decision-making process. What had previously been a two-way rela-
tionship had now become a tripartite relationship: this created a “new way of
working that civil servants hadn’t seen before. . ..that the papers are filtered through
special advisers” (Interview 19). In the days of phase two above (Mallon and
Trimble), the SPAD “was just a filter in the sense that the papers would arrive with
Mallon and Trimble still intact from they left the civil service but with their
comments added,” whereas in this new phase, this “has changed quite substantially
in what gets to the minister is heavily changed before it gets there and that’s probably
where things changed quite dramatically” (Interview 19, 2018).
The changing nature of the politician-bureaucrat relationship is adeptly captured
below:
It didn’t really fully change in the first period of devolution 1999-2002, but subsequently in
the second period of devolution from 2002 it appeared to change quite dramatically in that
period. Suddenly you had this situation where the very senior civil servants were having to
defer to special advisors for access to the minister or to influence the minister. Whereas prior
to that permanent secretaries were god..Ministers wouldn’t dared open their mouth without
clearing with the permanent secretary beforehand. Even direct rule ministers would have
been very cautious about moving without . . .I can remember one famous permanent
secretary in the Department of Agriculture who insisted that every submission went through
him, nothing got to the minister without him seeing it. Now not all perm sec’s do that,
although there are a few of them who exercise that level of control. Suddenly you reverse
that culture to a position where nothing got to a minister unless it was filtered through special
advisers and that was quite a significant change for the civil service. (Interview 19, 2018)
This view is further substantiated by the interviewee below:
My view of what happened is when in 2007 when we got back in, there was just a growing
confidence of the DUP and SF as things went on and civil servants were side-lined and since.
I felt that personally, in my role, in which I would I have tried to find middle paths for things,
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middle ground and draft things with square brackets and all that sort of stuff was really not
welcomed. I was just kind of told, [. . .], just why are you doing that, that’s not your role. That
was a big difference. That evolved and got more and more political more like the European
way or something. The political people do all the negotiating without involving the bureau-
crats. (Interview 17, 2018)
Akin to O’Connor (2014, 2017), Knox and McMahon (2014:4) argue that:
the day-to-day responsibilities of civil servants have changed. The job of the civil servant has
become one of a network manager dependent on the resources of other actors over which he/
she has limited authority.
Civil servants during this period operated in a shared power structure where decisions
could not be made unilaterally by either the politician or the bureaucrat. These changes
are not unique to the politician-bureaucrat dichotomy in Northern Ireland, but are
reflective of changes across the Western world. Civil servants now work in:
a shared power world in which government shares authority with a range of people and
organisations. This requires a new way of looking at policy development and implementa-
tion where public policies are co-designed and co-produced with those people and organi-
sations that deliver and use public services. The role of civil servants is to exercise a much
more pluralist approach by reaching consensus between competing interests in support of the
Minister. (Knox and McMahon 2014, p43)
In his evidence to the RHI inquiry, Sir Malcolm McKibben, Head of the Northern
Ireland Civil Service, (2011–2018) summarized politico-administrative relations
during our phase two and phase three:
Very briefly, if you go back to 2007 whenever the Executive was formed, it brought together
five different parties with very different economic, social and constitutional aspirations, and
that first mandate between 2007 and 2011 was really about building trust between the parties,
getting them to learn how to work together, and to stabilise the institutions. (Renewable Heat
Incentive Inquiry 2018a p.64)
The evidence considered for phase three when overlaid with Kaufman’s model of the
competing bureaucratic values which mediate transition (neutral competence, represen-
tativeness, and executive leadership) suggests that executive leadership is held equitably
by the politician and the bureaucrat as a consequence of developing trust and common
purpose and the consolidation of institutional and interpersonal relationships. In addi-
tion, the role of the bureaucrat in “thrashing out” a consensus view attests to increased
politicization and a move away from neutral competence. This analysis substantiates
O’Connor’s (2014) finding that bureaucrat role conceptions may evolve in power-
sharing to assume an active conflict management function, where policy development
requires the incorporation of “heightened political awareness” necessary to chart a center
course between ideologically opposed political protagonists.
10 M. Rouse and K. O’Connor
Phase Four: Power-Splitting 2011–2017
The Political Environment
Following changes to parliamentary rules, in 2016, both the SDLP (Nationalist) and
UUP (Unionist) rejected their entitlement to seats in the multi-party executive in
favor of forming the first official opposition since devolution. Governance arrange-
ments almost collapsed four times during this phase. In 2013, Richard Haass and
Meghan O’Sullivan attempted to broker a deal to resolve legacy issues from the
conflict culminating in the Stormont House Agreement in 2014. In 2015, the Fresh
Start Agreement focused on selected residual issues including the role of paramili-
taries, the budget, welfare reform, legacy, and corporation tax. This period was
characterized by political instability and institutional fragility, and, at times, the
institutions were on the verge of collapse and, indeed, did collapse following the
resignation of the Deputy First Minister in January 2017 (Renewable Heat Incentive
Inquiry 2018a, p65). During this period, we argue that power was now split between
both main parties, as opposed to “shared” in the context of an inclusive executive. Of
relevance to our research question, the balance of power between the politician and
bureaucrat now rested firmly with the politician and special adviser.
In his testimony to the RHI enquiry, Sir Malcom McKibbin, Former Head of the
Civil Service, noted a shift in emphasis during this period. Notwithstanding a real
determination to implement the commitments in the Programme for Government, “it
quickly ran into some significant problems that affected the potential stability of the
institutions, so it was a very fragile time” (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018a,
p64). During this period:
decisions were made by the Ministers. Any policy agreement that was being made was put
up in a submission to the Minister and. . . both sides of the house had to sign that off. If the
submission wasn’t signed off, it went into a place we called brokerage, and it sat there until
the two parties were able to reconcile their differences or amend the policy direction in one
way or another. (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018a, p67)
The level of engagement between the civil service and political level is demon-
strated by Sir Malcolm McKibbin’s evidence, which clearly articulates a brokering
role for the bureaucrat between opposing political protagonists:
The biggest difference, I suppose, that my role involved during the time that I was head of
Civil Service was the engagement in the annual political crisis negotiations. I mean, they
took up months — months. I mean, there was a huge number of hours put into those
negotiations, either between the five parties or, indeed, between the two parties and the
British and Irish Government. I mean, that was a huge difference between what I would’ve
done in another Department and what I was doing in OFMDFM. And that wasn’t part of the
job spec, let me tell you, at the beginning. (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018a, p68)
The role of the elite civil servant had changed. The civil servant while still perceiving
their role to “serve the government of the day” found this task now involved a higher
level of real politics than civil servants were comfortable with. At the RHI enquiry,
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Permanent Secretary Dr. Andrew McCormick was asked if there was an unwilling-
ness on the part of the civil service to say “No” to ministers, to which he responded:
There’s probably a bit of apprehension that, if we raise these issues too often, we’ll be seen as
awkward. You know, unhelpful. (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018b, p19)
The relationship narrative identified here resonates strongly with that identified in
phase two where an imbalance of power and a level of mistrust characterizes the
working relationship between the civil servant and political actors. A key distinction,
however, between this phase and phase two is that the bureaucrat’s access to the
minister is now mediated by the special adviser in a tripartite arrangement:
The assumption was that you couldn’t get to the Minister other than through the special
adviser, and that’s what the Minister was comfortable with, and had we realised that,
actually, that was far from the case a bit sooner, we might have done things differently.
(Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018b:134)
Dr. Andrew McCormick was directly questioned by the chair of the inquiry on the
nature of the power dynamics between himself as departmental permanent secretary
and the special adviser when it was revealed that potentially sensitive emails had
been exchanged between two special advisers in respect of delays in the implemen-
tation of cost controls to prevent abuse of the flawed scheme. When pressed by the
chairman if he, in his capacity as departmental accounting officer, may have asked to
see the emails, Dr. McCormick responded:
they were mentioned to me in a way that in — in a way that conveyed quite clearly that I
wasn’t gonna see them. (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018b, p44)
When pressed further, McCormick responded that even if he had asked for the emails:
I don’t think I would’ve been given them. . .In the atmosphere and context of that time, that did
not occur to me, and I’m clear I would’ve been rebuffed. . ..I think the reality of what we’d got
used to was that they were in charge, and had made— they’d made that very clear, from 2007
onwards, that things would be done their way. (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018b, p44)
Dr. McCormick’s account of power asymmetries in the politico-administrative
relationship is affirmed by that of David Sterling, current Head of the NICS, then
Permanent Secretary of the Department of Finance. Mr. Sterling similarly indicated
that he had no knowledge of discussions which took place between the special advisers
in his department with a special adviser in another department in respect of the scheme.
Under questioning, Mr. Sterling articulated the view that “the special adviser is
responsible to the Minister” (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018, p16). The
chair, however, interjected to point out that the special adviser was also a civil servant,
to which Mr. Sterling acknowledges:
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Quite clearly the issue here is that I wasn't being advised. . .of this engagement between the
special advisers in the two Departments. (Renewable Heat Incentive Inquiry 2018c, p16)
During this phase, the politician and the adviser are demonstrating executive
dominance (Kaufman 1956). Such a shift in authority is not necessarily unique to the
contested society of Northern Ireland: back in 2004, Svara cautioned that “relation-
ships [between politicians and administrators] are becoming ever more complex.
World-wide, we are witnessing a reassertion of political control that could evolve
into inappropriate interference.” In this chapter, we have presented evidence to
support this claim. Here the pendulum now rests firmly with Kaufman’s concept
of executive dominance; neutral competence is diminished by the increased politi-
cization and the bureaucrats active conflict management role. Representativeness is
also impacted by an attrition of inclusivity. The NI bureaucrat now serves a two-
party coerced coalition as opposed to the inclusive, consensus-based grand coalition
envisaged by Lijphart (1969) in his original prescription for plural societies.
Toward a Framework of Politico-Administrative Relations
To examine the politico-administrative axis, we employ a conceptual framework
based on Kaufman’s seminal “three bureaucratic values” that guide bureaucratic
reform: authoritarian (executive) leadership, representativeness, and bureaucratic
neutrality. Recall, it is the interaction of these three values that have determined
the nature of public administration over time. His framework, applied to Ethiopia by
Mengistu and Vogel (2006), “provides a succinct illustration of the struggle that
newly constituted governments in transitional states undergo.” In the triangle below,
we map the four phases onto Kaufman’s theory of bureaucratic values. In Northern
Ireland, we have seen a rebalancing of bureaucratic values over the past 20 years –
from neutrality and representativeness to executive dominance.
The phases of government identified above demonstrate the usefulness of
Kaufman’s theory for understanding the politico-administrative dichotomy. The
overtly neutral values that guided the civil service under direct rule gave way to an
uneasy, if sometimes acrimonious, relationship between politicians and bureaucrats
in the early years of devolution (phase two). These years of power-sharing embodied
the values of representativeness, while in the final phase of power-splitting, we see
executive values dominating the bureaucrat-politician relationship. Figure 1 depicts
the politico-administrative axis and the role of the elite-level bureaucrat therein
during the 20 years of power-sharing.
Conceptually, in phase one – during direct rule –we expect the bureaucrat to be in
delivery mode; policies are simply adapted fromWestminster to the Northern Ireland
context. In phase two, in the early days of power-sharing, the bureaucrat knows the
system, and the politician is relatively inexperienced. The politician, new to the
game, will be suspicious of the bureaucrat and his/her intentions. In the third phase,
trust has built up between the politician and the bureaucrat and indeed between the
former political rivals; we are now entering a more collaborative era where executive
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leadership is mutually held by the bureaucrat and politician. Finally, in the fourth
phase, the politicians know the rules of the game sufficiently and rely less on
bureaucratic advice. In this scenario, politicians are firmly in control of executive
leadership.
Concluding Remarks
The analysis presented above has developed a conceptual framework for under-
standing the bureaucrat-politician dichotomy within Kaufman’s model of bureau-
cratic values. This template can be replicated in other contested societies to
understand how the balance of power between politician and bureaucrats fits with
the conflict management – conflict resolution trajectory. An understanding of polit-
ico-administrative relations will prove useful to those interested in understanding
why the governance institutions have failed in Northern Ireland and those interested
in learning from the Northern Ireland experience. Both politicians and bureaucrats
have invested heavily in creating a peaceful and prosperous society; however, the
balance between Kaufman’s values has recently tipped toward executive leadership
to the neglect of representativeness and neutrality.
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